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There are several questions fitting to this introduction: how is sovereign debt priced, 
and why is it relevant to engage in such a study, notably in the context of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)? In fact, it is important to understand how sovereign 
bonds are priced in the secondary market – hence above the first question.  
The existing literature puts forward a number of plausible determinants of sovereign 
bond yields that are used by market participants – institutional investors as insurance 
companies and banks – and individual investors. Such indicators relate to a country´s 
macroeconomic and fiscal performance, but also to other reasons that might weight in on an 
investor´s mind just as much, which are country-specific unrelated.  
Moreover, the EMU is a group of countries that have a political project of shared 
sovereignty, including a common currency. Indeed, since the foundation of the Euro in 
January 1999 up until the global credit crunch in August 2007, investors have not 
differentiated much between EMU member states’ sovereign bonds. However, from the later 
part of 2007 onwards, the spread from an EMU member state 10-year maturity bond vis-à-vis 
the “virtually risk free” counterpart Bund started to increase. This increase varied from 
country to country. In practice, it has been argued investors started to question member states 
commitment to the political project and to soundness of their fiscal developments.  
Therefore, in this paper we study a group of indicators as possible determinants of 
bond spreads, between 1999 and 2014, using a quarterly data set, for 11 members of the euro. 
Germany 10-year bonds are the benchmark for the spread. Our analysis aims at trying to 
understand if market participants have in fact regarded the EMU as a block or not, before and 
during the 2008-2009 economic and financial turmoil. It was also factored into the present 
analysis the widely discussed concepts of “core” and “peripheral” countries. The testable 
hypothesis is whether market participants have considered the EMU either a cohesive set of 
countries or as 11 distinctive ones.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section two reviews the related literature. 
Section present the methodology used in our analysis. Section four discusses the estimation 
results and section five concludes.  
 
2. Literature 
Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011), through an OLS-HAC methodology, model 10-year 
bond yield spreads, vis-à-vis Germany, on three types of variables: credit risk, liquidity risk 





It is noteworthy here because it divides analysis covers the time interval between January 
1999 and February 2010 (monthly data), including three intra-interval analyses: before the 
Global Credit Crunch (up until August 2007), from November 2007 to February 2009 and 
from March 2009 until the end of the time frame. It included 10 EMU countries. Throughout 
these 3 sub-samples there were shifts in the expectations of market participants. 
Giordano et al. (2012), study the period 2002:01-2012:05 for 10 EMU countries, and 
present an aggregate analysis that finds statistical significance for the primary budget balance-
to-GDP ratio.  
For Kilponenm et al. (2012) there is a different interpretation for the VIX indicator, it 
does not translate general risk appetite as much as the riskiness of the stock market. As 
investor restlessness increases in the stock market (corporate bonds included), sovereign 
bonds are perceived as a “less risky choice”. 
Afonso and Rault (2015) used a SUR methodology to assess the determinants of real 
long-run interest rates, in the period 1973-2008, with yearly data for 17 OECD economies. 
The authors report that for 11 countries increases in their respective debt-to-GDP ratios raise 
their respective real long-term interest rates. Such increases ranged from 6 to over 100 basis 
points (b.p.). Also, an improvement in the current account meant a reduction in interest rates 
for 10 economies. When the debt level is replaced by the budget balance-to-GDP ratio, this 
flow variable comes out performing just as well as its corresponding stock variable, reducing 
interest rates between 9 and almost 80 b.p. Increased sovereign liquidity was found to reduce 
the cost of debt servicing in diverse economies such as France, Luxembourg and Portugal. 
Finally, Afonso et al. (2014), use a 2SLS panel fixed effects approach, between 
January 1999 and November 2010 (monthly data). They use dummy variables to allow for 
different time periods analysis. Among the results, the debt-to-GDP ratio (differential against 
Germany) doubled its effect on spreads between roughly the first decade of the euro (prior to 
August 2007) and the European Debt Crisis (in this sample between March 2009 and 
November 2010). The liquidity variable was only significant after March 2009, it being 
ignored by markets before that. Additionally, the VIX, despite not being significant before the 
Global Credit Crunch (August 2007), became increasingly relevant and went on to have a far 
bigger say on the spread evolution when the Sovereign Debt Crisis was in place (from March 







3.1. Spread determinants 
This study focuses on the determinants of sovereign 10-year bond yield spreads of 11 
EMU countries, vis-à-vis Germany´s. We model the spreads on a diversified group of 
variables: credit, liquidity and international risk. According to Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe 
(2009), the pricing of 10-year bonds in the Euro area relative to German bond yields reflects 
“traders’ beliefs about default and liquidity risks rather directly”. The cross-sections (i) are: 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. The frequency of the data is quarterly and it ranges from 1999 to 2014. 
There are some data shortages across the time-series and on both ends of the time frame, 
which are assessed for robustness by excluding Greece (see data sample in Table A1 in the 
Appendix). 




 lags of the spreads are meant to account for persistence, in 
other words how much do past spreads affect current spreads. Not including them will 
generate omitted variable bias. In turn, lagged spreads are correlated with the country fixed 
effects. However, this effect will be mitigated once the size of the panel time-series reaches 
20 time series observations, which and we have (T = 4 quarters x 15 years = 60 observations). 
Therefore, there is a net benefit from using lags in the specification (Afonso et al., 2014). 
Alternatively, monthly data would have contributed better for a higher time 
dimension, notwithstanding, monthly data for fiscal fundamentals is unavailable.  In addition, 
Giordano et al. (2012) argue that it may take some time before the change in a macro variable 
impacts the sovereign default risk, hence a second reason why the lagged spreads for t-2 
should be included. There was also a marginal benefit from adding the second period lagged 
spreads, as it was noted it improved significantly the Durbin-Watson statistic in our analysis.  
The variation of the debt ratio is also an important indicator of a country’s fiscal 
sustainability. In fact, rising fiscal unsustainability will tend to raise sovereign default risk and 
prompt a surge in sovereign risk premium.  
On the other hand, the overall and the primary budget balance-to-GDP ratios are also 
interesting to include. Indeed, it might be useful to consider both variables to understand if 
investors look solely at the budget balance or more at the primary budget balance instead, 
discarding interests on debt. The latter measure allows assessing the budgetary performance 
of the government without being clouded by the payments on government debt, which tend to 





The GDP growth rate is an important indicator because a fall of the GDP growth rate 
will lower tax revenues in the future and in turn that will impact a country´s solvency Also, 
when its rate is subtracted to the yield of sovereign bonds it is an indicator of debt 
sustainability. If that difference is negative then public finances are on an unsustainable path 
(see, for instance, Afonso and Jalles, 2014).     
The current account balance-to-GDP is a measure of how a country is positioned 
internationally, in terms of its net exports. According to Alexopoulou et al. (2009), as an 
economy becomes more reliant on capital inflows, it becomes more vulnerable to reversals in 
international flows of funding. In addition, the degree of openness (O) of the economy, 
computed as follows, , represents the ability to generate the trade surpluses to secure 
present debt refinancing. 
The use of the real effective exchange rate (REER) as a determinant is deemed 
fundamental because it is an indicator of a country’s competitiveness (Giordano et al. 2012). 
An increase in domestic prices relative to Euro Area 18 trade partners´ internal prices will 
harm foreign competitiveness. Therefore, it allows assessing if bond investors price loss of 
competitiveness, as an appreciation of the REER deteriorates the terms of trade and yield 
spreads are expected to increase. 
Inflation is also a relevant determinant since higher inflation reduces the real value of 
debt while subtracting to the nominal yield. It can also flag macroeconomic stability, and 
higher inflation may imply higher sovereign risk (Afonso and Rault (2015)).  
Regarding our liquidity measure it is computed as the share of a given country´s 
outstanding debt in the pool of debt of the 11 EMU countries: W= 
. . The more liquid is a given sovereign 
bond, the easier it is to sell it at any point in time.  
As already seen, international risk aversion can be proxied by the VIX, aiming at 
capturing spread movements outside a country´s intervention area: credit risk and liquidity 
risk. 
Table 1 shows a summary for the sign of the expected coefficients of each sovereign 







3.2. Panel Two Stage Least Squares 
The use of 2SLS addresses to some extent the endogeneity problem, since, in our case, 
while fiscal developments may imping on sovereign spreads, the spreads will also have an 
impact of fiscal variables. For instance, and more specifically, not only the variation of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio influences the sovereign yield spread, but also spread behaviour might 
have influence on the debt-to-GDP ratio, and the same is true notably for market liquidity.  
We carry out a dynamic panel analysis with the general baseline model specification 
as follows: 
(1) Sit = cons + 1 it-1 + 2 it-2 + 3 it + 4 it + 5 it + 6 it + 7 it + 8 it + 9 it 
+ 10 t + i + it , where  
I are the country fixed effects and it, are the normally distributed error terms. 
 The set of exogenous independent variables { it-1 , …, t} stand for the proxy 
variables of  the endogenous independent variables { it-1, …, t}. Such proxies are generated 
in the first stage of the 2SLS method. In it, we are to find an instrument variable Zit that 
influences the endogenous regressor {Sit-1, …, Vt} but that Sit does not have influence over Zit. 
The new estimates for {Sit-1, …, Vt} include the instrument variable Zit and the exogenous 
variables from the regression above, for instance, taking the variation of the debt ratio: 
 
(2) it = + 1 it-1 + 2 it-2 + 3 it + 4 it + 5 it + 6 it + 7 it + 8 it + 9 it + 
10 t + it , 
where it is the 1-period lag of it. While the 1-period lag of it still has influence over 
Sit, Sit has no influence over the 1-period lag of it. This process is replicated for all the 
other variables {Sit-1, …, Vt \ ΔDit}, Zit being the 1-period lag of each one of said variables. 
The second stage of the 2SLS is then to insert equation (2) back in equation (1).  
Another relevant hypothesis for the analysis is the different behaviour of two groups 
of countries: core and peripheral EMU countries. These are two separate regressions – one 
bears dummy Ui and the other one takes on dummy Qi, in order to avoid the dummy variable 





Ui and Qi are two separate qualitative variables, they are also the categories for each one of 
them. Since we aim at looking at both core and peripheral countries, both Ui and Qi are 
relevant and as a result that leaves us to run two separate regressions to escape the trap. It is 
most worthy to determine if the countries within each group were looked upon by market 
participants similarly. These two groups were taken from Afonso et al. (2014): the core 
countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands and the 
peripheral countries are Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
Secondly, alternatively we also use time dummies to partition the time frame in three 
different time periods. This is to check if the determinants influencing spreads have shifted 
according to the following time periods: roughly the first decade of the Euro (1999:Q1-
2007:Q2, dummy Z01t), the Global Credit Crunch (2007:Q3-2009:Q1, dummy Z02t) and the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis (2009:Q2-2014:Q4, dummy Z03t). 
Again, we have 3 qualitative variables that share the same categories (Z01 t, Z02t and 
Z03t), so in order to escape the dummy variable trap, either we estimate one less regression 
than the number of categories (2 regressions, 1 including 2 dummies), or we estimate one 
regression per dummy. We chose to do the later. 
Thirdly, we analyse which determinants are affecting bond yield spreads for each 
group of countries, one sub-period at a time. Specification (3) below is an example of a 
baseline model including two qualitative variables: Ui and Z01t, when the fiscal variable is the 
budget balance-to-GDP ratio. In other words, it’s a specification for the peripheral EMU 
during the first decade of the Euro. 
(3) Sit = cons + 1 it-1 + 2 it-2 + 3 it + 4 it + 5 it + 6 it + 7 it + 8 it + 9 it + 
10 t + 1 it-1UiZ01t + 2 it-2UiZ01t + 3 itUiZ01t + 4 itUiZ01t + 5 itUiZ01t + 
6 itUiZ01t + 7 itUiZ01t + 8 itUiZ01t + 9 itUiZ01t + 10 tUiZ01t + i + it 
 
 3.3. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
The presence of cross-section dependency renders the OLS estimator inefficient and 
biased, making its estimates poor candidates for inference. Therefore SUR techniques can 
alleviate this problem, as long as the time series dimension is substantially larger than the 
number of cross-sections (Afonso and Rault, 2015), which is our case (T = 60 and N = 11). 





equations but that contemporary correlation exists between the residuals of all equations. This 
model single specification’s is as follows: 
 
(4) Sit = cons + 1Sit-1 + 2Sit-2 + 3 Dit + 4Git + 5Eit + 6Oit + 7Wit + 8Hit + 9Cit + 
10Vt 
 
This model covers the entire time span. Although this allows for interesting results, it 
would have been interesting to carry out separate SUR systems for the time sub periods 
employed here. However, the quarterly frequency of the data of our study did not allow for 
that. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Data 
Table A2 in the Appendix explains the variables and respective source. Appendix 
Table A3 gives information on the stationarity of the variables, and it was possible to reject 
the null hypothesis that stationarity was not present, for the overall majority of the variables. 
An alternative would be to use the variables that had failed the test in 1
st
 differences or even 
to calculate all variables as differentials against Germany´s data. The only variable that was 
transformed was the variation of the debt-level (originally the debt-to-GDP ratio) because it 
was the only stock variable in our set of variables. 
It should be mentioned that for the dependent variable it was not possible to reject H0 
at a 10% level. The variable did pass this test when the test was run for the variable´s first 
differences. However, regressions containing spreads data in first differences did not yield 
good R2 statistics: either negative or unusually low statistics. We provide in Table 3 an 
example of the regression results in first differences. Additionally, Table A4 in the Appendix 
shows the results for the presence of co-integration among the 11 EMU countries used in our 
study. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the 10-year bond yield spreads for the set of countries 





 quarters of 2007 that the Eurozone ceased to enjoy significant homogeneity among its 
member states’ spreads against the benchmark, the 10-year German Bund. This development 
was due to the Global Credit Crunch that had begun in August that year with the burst of the 





March 2009 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, amid fears for Greek public finances, as 
well as for other European peripheral countries. Such fears were confirmed later in October 
2009 as Greece announced a 12.5% budget deficit. 
[Figure 1] 
 
Figure 2 presents another version of Figure 1, now grouping Core EMU countries and 
the Peripheral EMU ones. One can see very clearly the two moments when peripheral EMU 
spreads jump, the first corresponding to the Global Credit Crunch and the second one owed to 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis. Bond market participants’ called on the EMU countries for a 
premium on their debt was not unjustified, considering investors were uneasy about where to 
park their money (from 2Q2007 onwards). The increase in international risk perception also 




Also, the Eurozone, on aggregate terms, on average, ran budget deficits during the 
first decade of the Euro (Table 2), although i did present primary budget surpluses during that 
same time (Table A5 in the Appendix). 
 
[Table 2] 
Such a scenario has direct impact on their borrowing capacity. In addition, looking at 
the differential between GDP growth rate and the 10-year bond yields, a crucial measure 
regarding the sustainability of public finances, this differential was mostly negative for the 11 
EMU countries’ average (Figure 4). Moreover, Figure 5 shows a significant gap between the 
cost of debt and economic growth, yet a decreasing one for the 11 countries average, for the 





In practice, the perceived risk associated in sovereign bonds relative to the safe haven 
of Germany increased during the global economic downturn. Taking a look at Table 2, core 





Also, at the end of the first decade of the Euro, peripheral countries were already in violation 
of the Maastricht Criteria, while Core ones where not. 
Therefore, from the Global Credit Crunch onwards spread pricing was more markedly 
on a “country-by-country basis”. According to Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2011), little after 
the beginning of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, Greece was [the first country] 
transferred from a regime under which there was the perception of fully guaranteed fiscal 
liabilities to a regime “without” fiscal guarantees. It should be said though, that bond market 
participants did not proceed to differentiate among the two different types of countries from 
the onset of the Global Credit Crunch. From Table 2, sovereign yields were only twice higher 
during this period, compared to 8 times higher during the Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
 
4.2. Discussion of Estimated Results 
Panel Two Stage Least Squares 
Table 3 shows the results for the baseline model where the variation of the debt-to-
GDP ratio, the government balance and the government primary balance interchanges.  
[Table 3] 
Specification (3) includes the primary balance, which is not statistically significant 
(also the case excluding Greece). The variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio estimate in (1) is 
statistically significant: if it increases by 10 p.p. the spread of the 11 EMU countries will 
increase by 0.14 p.p., on average, ceteris paribus. Specification (2) uses the budget balance 
ratio as the fiscal variable, and it has a greater impact on the spread than the variation of the 
debt level: for an increase of 10 p.p. in the budget balance ratio, i.e. an increase in the current 
fiscal surplus, the spreads are expected to decrease close to 0.4 p.p. 
Looking at the baseline regressions, and fiscal variables aside, apart from the inflation 
rate, the REER and the current account balance, the other variables were not statistically 
significant.  
The use of the interaction dummy Z01 does not provide additional relevant results 
(Annex Table A6), and one may conclude that market participants were not pricing any of the 
determinants during the first decade of the EMU. Other than this, neither the baseline nor the 
robust regressions carrying either the budget balance or the primary budget balance were 
insightful. The results for Z02 and Z03 were equally barren. This points out for yet again no 
active linkages between the determinants and spreads, when considering the aggregate 
analysis, between the 3
rd
 quarter of 2007 and the 1
st
 quarter of 2009 and 2
nd
 quarter 2009 and 
4
th





Table 4 shows the relevant results from the dummies introduced for the Core and 
Peripheral groups.  
[Table 4] 
Looking at (1), a 10 p.p. budget balance increase relief spreads by approximately half 
a p.p. for the aggregate group. If considering the Core group exclusively, when said budget 
balance increase takes place, the spreads essentially remain unchanged, albeit with an overall 
small decrease, revealing that the improvement effect form the budget balance on spreads is 
stemming from the periphery countries. In (2), the only difference is the budget balance is 
replaced by the variation of the debt-to-GDP-ratio. When looking at the aggregate group, 
spreads increase by roughly a quarter of a p.p. when there is a variation of 1 p.p. of the debt-
to-GDP ratio. So a fiscal deterioration from the point of view of the variation of debt is less 
impactful than from the budget balance standpoint. If considering Core countries only again, 
the overall effect on the spreads is virtually zero, and the previous conclusion for the budget 
balance still holds here. In (3) and (4) one can find more or less the same results, but less 
pronounced, as Greece is excluded here.  
An important conclusion to take from Table 3 results is the following way: while a 
fiscal deterioration at the 11 EMU level worsens the spreads, Core countries’ spreads seem to 
react less and the effect is more via the periphery country group. This is a reasonable result 
given that Core countries have hardly exceeded Maastricht Criteria limits throughout the 
lifetime of the Euro, even during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
Regarding the combination of dummies U and Q with the dummies Z01, Z02 and Z03, 
they will allow for the most drill down in this study. Before any financial turmoil, there is no 
evidence for the Core countries of bond market participants concern for pricing spreads. 
Regarding the same period, for the Peripheral group, Table 5 regression (1) shows there is 
once again evidence of an increase in the variation of the debt levels leading to a decrease in 
spreads.  
[Table 5] 
This is evidence in favour of the “Convergence Trade Hypothesis” with investors  
buying sovereign bonds of peripheral EU countries in the hope that their yields would 
converge with those of Germany’s. It would also seem markets were not pricing correctly the 
worsening of EMU Peripheral´s fiscal position  
For the period between August 2007 and March 2009 there was a global contraction in 
credit. The combination of dummies described above will test if that affected in any way the 





statistically significant As far as the Peripheral EMU countries, the outcome of the baseline 
regressions was equally uneventful. Once Greece is excluded, several coefficients become 
statistically significant (at least those from variables Git, Eit and Cit). This leads one to think 
Greece´s debt was priced differently and separately from Southern Europe’s and Ireland´s for 
the better part of the Global Credit Crunch.  
Moreover, still in Table 5, we can see that increases in the GDP growth rate and the 
Real Effective Exchange rate were welcomed by investors, especially the former: a 1 p.p. 
increase would bring about a spread reduction of the same order of magnitude. Moreover, 
market participants seemed to have regarded trade surpluses in an even more favourable light: 
an increase in the Current Account-to-GDP ratio would have reduced spreads in these 4 
countries 1 ¼ times that surplus increase. Lastly, it should be noted spreads here suffered too 
from international markets volatility: 1 p.p. increase in the VIX increased spreads by almost a 
quarter of a p.p.  
 Table 6 shows the results for the Peripheral EMU taking into account the period 
comprising the Sovereign Debt Crisis until 2014. In both regressions 1 and 2 good fiscal 
performance (Bit and Dit) and Economic growth (Git) impact positively on EMU´s peripheral 
countries and therefore help explain EMU peripheral spreads developments after 2009:Q1. 
Inflation increase aggravates spreads: this is expected, since investors will demand a higher 
nominal yield as higher inflation reduces real return on sovereign bonds. Running trade 
surpluses has also been priced by investors. Despite of this, a higher degree of economic 
openness and higher market liquidity seem to aggravate spreads, as its coefficients are 
statistically significant. In this case the VIX estimated coefficient can be considered if one 
interprets VIX as a measure of stock markets volatility and bond markets a safe haven.  
[Table 6] 
From regressions (3) and (4) there is some evidence of market different pricing 
treatment for Greece that had been found during the Global Credit Crunch somewhat 
changed, judging by the statistical significance of some variables’ coefficients.  
 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
The SUR exercise presents further evidence that Greece has been perceived by 
markets differently from the rest of the EMU Periphery. Recalling Figure 1, it can be seen that 
Greece was the EMU member state which saw its spreads peak the most. Additionally, the 






Firstly, in Table 8 A, yield spreads in Greece are influenced by developments in the 
Real Effective Exchange rate, while from looking at Table 5 (3) the average of the EMU 
Periphery (Greece excluded) had its spreads influenced by developments in the Current 
Account, on average. Albeit arguments for the strong correlation between terms of trade and 
net exports, namely a real depreciation of the Real Effective Exchange rate leading to an 
improvement in the Current Account, there is little evidence supporting that (Chinn and Lee, 
2006). 
[Table 8 A] 
Secondly, Table 8 A points to markets having priced sovereign debt according to the 
specific member state. When exploring this SUR system, investors priced the sovereign debt 
of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands after international 
markets volatility, but so too those of Italy´s and Portugal´s. However this is not evidence 
contrary to country-specific pricing, as the VIX does not reflect country-specific data. 
Furthermore, comparing Table 4 (2) and Table A7, other than investor fear (VIX) and spreads 
persistence (Sit-1), neither the Core group nor the EMU Periphery share, in a consistent 
manner, any of the determinants.  
Thirdly, the fact that VIX was reported to have taken a toll on some country´s spreads 
and not on others, relates to the intuition of the VIX by Attinasi et al. (2010): in times of 
heightened uncertainty it could be higher for some euro area countries than for others. 
Table 8 B resembles the SUR analysis above with a slight difference: data for the 
three interest rate spreads variables is in first differences. Just as in the two stage least squares 
first difference exercise, it bears no fruits: R
2




We have conducted Panel and SUR analyses to attempt to unveil meaningful 
determinants of 10-year Sovereign Bond yield spreads for 11 EMU member states, between 
1999 and 2014, using quarterly data.  
According to our results, there is evidence that most yield spread determinants were 
not being priced before August 2007. Also, Greece was priced differently from the remainder 
of the EMU periphery during the Global Credit Crunch. Furthermore, good fiscal 
performance and economic growth are favourably taken into account. 
We have also found that, on average, for the full sample, a 10 p.p. increase in the 





evidence that capital markets did not regard the primary fiscal balance in their pricing of 
sovereign debt and there was strong evidence for the “Convergence Trade Hypothesis”. 
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Independent Variable Sit-1 Sit-2 ΔDit Bit Pit Git Hit Oit Cit Eit Wit Vt 
Expected influence on the Dependent 
Variable 
+ + + – – – + – – + – +/- 
Table 2 











AT BE FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT SP 
Z01 -1.32 -0.35 -2.48 -2.61 -0.66 3.80 -2.49 -6.59 1.19 -3.02 0.55 -0.69 -4.54 0.57 
Z02 -1.39 0.57 -3.74 -1.58 -0.41 4.76 -2.86 -8.50 -3.31 -2.42 3.50 0.03 -3.46 -1.01 
Z03 -5.62 -3.02 -8.74 -3.05 -3.97 -2.11 -5.39 -10.47 -13.29 -3.64 0.21 -3.84 -7.42 -8.88 
Current Account balance-to-GDP ratio (%) 
Z01 0.15 4.26 -4.71 1.13 3.32 5.73 0.85 -7.19 -1.37 -0.94 10.42 4.97 -9.00 -5.06 
Z02 -2.37 2.79 -8.56 4.35 -1.08 2.34 -1.63 -14.17 -5.26 -2.72 8.62 4.16 -11.78 -8.88 
Z03 0.17 2.36 -2.32 2.30 -0.69 -0.23 -1.53 -5.44 2.37 -1.21 6.01 8.29 -5.03 -2.29 
Debt-to-GDP ratio (%) 
Z01 62 56 70 70 105 40 62 104 31 105 6 50 59 50 
Z02 61 53 70 68 91 33 67 107 34 102 10 47 70 37 
Z03 88 68 113 81 104 50 87 154 102 121 21 63 112 74 
10-year bond yield spreads averages (p.p.) 
Z01 0.14 0.05 0.25 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.08 0.54 0.12 0.26 -0.34 0.08 0.20 0.14 
Z02 0.51 0.39 0.67 0.40 0.44 0.32 0.26 0.94 0.70 0.70 0.64 0.26 0.58 0.41 





Table 3: Spreads are modelled on the variables below. Baseline model: Specifications 















cons -1.865643 -4.344690*** -4.614988 -0.161284 -0.983513 -0.315657 
St-1 1.317044*** 1.284170*** 1.372468*** 1.242710*** 1.252734*** 1.199932*** 
St-2 -0.411749*** -0.384024*** -0.470422*** -0.558390*** -0.568151*** -0.549492*** 
ΔDit 0.013521***     0.007550*  0.041004 
Bit   -0.040137***    -0.004972  
Pit     -0.110926    
Git -0.021272 -0.014027 0.022319 0.003262 -0.001022 -0.025853 
Eit 0.014868 0.039209*** 0.044372 0.001219 0.009356 0.001420 
Oit 0.168992 0.060548 -0.108775 -0.096716 -0.127121 0.021224 
Wit 2.818663 2.315382 0.671531 2.116434 2.693363 4.283015 
Hit 0.053360** 0.068247*** 0.173396 0.022732 0.012122 -0.046942 
Cit -0.017373 -0.010885 0.029010 -0.030312* -0.027540* -0.044002 
Vt -0.005141 -0.000824 -0.004750 -0.006135 -0.005355 -0.005448 
Adj. R2 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.19 0.18 0.09 
2SLS country fixed effects; [1999:Q1,2014:Q4]; N=11; The instruments are the 1 period lag of each 






Table 4: Spreads are modelled on the variables below. Baseline model: Specifications 
(1) budget balance and (2) variation of debt-to-GDP ratio; Robustness model: (3) 
budget balance and (4) variation of debt-to-GDP ratio (all 4 with Core dummy) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
cons -2.984464 -1.523978 -2.456973** -0.534712 
St-1 1.146400*** 1.236449*** 1.235260*** 1.420487*** 
St-2 -0.249062*** -0.325590*** -0.329997*** -0.481583*** 
ΔDit  0.024338***  0.005548* 
Bit -0.057904***  -0.052458***  
Git -0.082201** -0.056373* 0.015566 -0.013093 
Eit 0.038585 0.006427 0.033200* -0.009725 
Oit 1.619883** 1.841730** 1.571242*** 1.354823** 
Wit 3.323186 3.392205 -1.084854 1.899561 
Hit 0.142776*** 0.108729*** 0.088898*** 0.014972 
Cit -0.065245** -0.060331** -0.020791 -0.041762** 
Vt -0.013387 -0.007777 0.007408 -0.001511 
St-1*Q 0.018957 -0.222860 -0.069903 -0.406898 
St-2*Q -0.065040 0.162310 0.015895 0.318303 
ΔDit*Q  -0.024533***  -0.005744 
Bit*Q 0.052894**  0.047449***  
Git*Q 0.088785** 0.061268 -0.008983 0.017988 
Eit*Q -0.037712 -0.008327 -0.032327 0.007825 
Oit*Q -1.206312 -1.409949 -1.157671** -0.923041 
Wit*Q -2.557601 -2.714275 1.850440 -1.221631 
Hit*Q -0.123188** -0.087857 -0.069309** 0.005900 
Cit*Q 0.066602* 0.064604 0.022147 0.046036* 
Vt*Q 0.019426 0.014627 -0.001369 0.008362 
Adj. R2 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 
2SLS country fixed effects; [1999:Q1,2014:Q4]; N=11 (1) (2) and N=10 (3) (4); Robustness model 
excludes Greece; The instruments are the 1 period lag of each regressor; Core countries are AT, BE, FI, 





Table 5: Spreads are modelled on the variables below. (1) Baseline regression with Peripheral and Z01 time period dummies, (2) robustness 
regression with Peripheral and Z02 time period dummies and (3) robustness model with Periphery dummy 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
cons -2.289558 cons -0.155451 cons -0.534712 
St-1 1.296397*** St-1 1.537574*** St-1 1.013589* 
St-2 -0.399164*** St-2 -0.621817*** St-2 -0.163280 
ΔDit 0.019819*** ΔDit 0.000710 ΔDit -0.000195 
Git -0.013105 Git 0.000140 Git 0.004895 
Eit 0.020433 Eit -0.004641 Eit -0.001900 
Oit -0.026571 Oit 0.384714 Oit 0.431782 
Wit 4.067818 Wit 3.005238 Wit 0.677930 
Hit 0.081054*** Hit -0.007196 Hit 0.020872 
Cit -0.024360 Cit 0.001929 Cit 0.004274 
Vt -0.008536 Vt -0.001318 Vt 0.006851 
St-1*Z01*U 0.087544 St-1*Z02*U 13.70126** St-1*U 0.406898 
St-2*Z01*U -0.096729 St-2*Z02*U -49.11148** St-2*U -0.318303 
ΔDit*Z01*U -0.021651* ΔDit*Z02*U -0.232250 ΔDit*U 0.005744 
Git*Z01*U 0.044163 Git*Z02*U -0.972949* Git*U -0.017988 
Eit*Z01*U 0.010037 Eit*Z02*U -0.199957** Eit*U -0.007825 
Oit*Z01*U -0.895988 Oit*Z02*U 6.784358* Oit*U 0.923041 
Wit*Z01*U -1.833715 Wit*Z02*U 39.22786** Wit*U 1.221631 
Hit*Z01*U 0.025776 Hit*Z02*U 0.625533 Hit*U -0.005900 
Cit*Z01*U 0.091987 Cit*Z02*U -1.263334* Cit*U -0.046036* 
Vt*Z01*U -0.007329 Vt*Z02*U 0.229739** Vt*U -0.008362 
Adj. R2 0.96 Adj. R2 0.84 Adj. R2 0.96 
2SLS country fixed effects; [1999:Q1,2014:Q4]; (1) N=11 (2) (3) N=10; Robustness model excludes Greece; The instruments are the 1 period lag of each regressor; (1) 
Peripheral countries are GR, IE, IT, PT, SP; (2) (3) Peripheral countries are IR, IT, PT, SP; Z01 refers to [1999:Q1,2007:Q2]; Z02 refers to [2007:Q3,2009:Q1]; The asterisks 





Table 7: Spreads are modelled on the variables below. Baseline regressions: Budget balance-to-GDP ratio (1) and variation of Debt-to-GDP ratio 
(2); Robustness regressions: budget balance-to-GDP ratio (3) and variation of debt-to-GDP ratio (4) (all with Peripheral and Z03 period time 
dummies) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
cons -0.687812 -2.660050 1.412162 0.216366 
St-1 1.252531 0.619842 1.830739** 1.375919* 
St-2 -0.454030 0.054169 -0.849597 -0.492770 
ΔDit   -0.000631  1.38E-05 
Bit -0.021737   -0.008931  
Git 0.008026 0.001245 -0.006963 -0.006081 
Eit -0.000419 0.015321 -0.013651 -0.003430 
Oit 0.689706 0.845293 0.215782 0.330612 
Wit -2.065902 0.268965 -2.624219 -2.627262 
Hit -0.013279 -0.031277 -0.003093 -0.007993 
Cit 0.008214 0.002520 0.011167 0.002919 
Vt 0.012072 0.017549 0.000727 0.004858 
St-1*Z03*U -0.224219 0.712194 -0.794983 -0.031196 
St-2*Z03*U 0.310555 -0.409158 0.595797 -0.101792 
Bit*Z03*U -0.078555**  -0.099604***  
ΔDit*Z03*U  0.108495***  0.068770*** 
Git*Z03*U -0.146132** 0.014012 -0.146146*** -0.062601 
Eit*Z03*U -0.004873 -0.007457 -0.000532 0.009921* 
Oit*Z03*U 1.916469*** 1.688171*** 1.544498*** 1.492657*** 
Wit*Z03*U 4.772986** 6.054893*** 3.031950* 1.855615 
Hit*Z03*U 0.234121*** 0.105142 0.396092*** 0.297292*** 
Cit*Z03*U -0.303332*** -0.280956*** -0.236141*** -0.195211*** 
Vt*Z03*U -0.163528*** -0.165575*** -0.149576*** -0.163790*** 
Adj. R2 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.93 
2SLS country fixed effects; [1999:Q1,2014:Q4]; N=11 (1) (2) and N = 10 (3) and (4); Robustness model excludes Greece; The instruments are the 1 period lag of each 
regressor; Peripheral countries are GR, IE, IT, PT, SP; Z03 refers to [2009:Q2,2014:Q4]; The asterisks *** ** * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively; 





Table 8: Spreads are modelled on the variables below. 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions system of equations; [1999:Q1,2014:Q4]; N=11; The variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio is the fiscal performance variable; Table 12 A uses 




8 A AT BE SP FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT 
cons -1.694739 -3.424466 -2.554782 -1.409619 -2.189952 -64.96017 1.013107 -7.655407* -2.090313 1.126169 -25.25026*** 
St-1 0.995861*** 0.749869*** 1.285301*** 0.697034*** 0.906117*** 1.138763*** 1.267278*** 0.925645*** 0.831098*** 0.494870*** 0.882952*** 
St-2 -0.319275*** -0.088249 -0.411632*** -0.164952** -0.106720 -0.420023*** -0.582214*** -0.123502* -0.015645 -0.205082** 0.015152 
ΔDit 0.001887 0.000126 0.001195 0.001376 0.001175 -0.046910 0.053097*** 0.001579 0.020353 0.005380* 0.131032*** 
Git -0.007936 0.019091* -0.008379 -0.003913 0.002116 -0.172096 0.024134 0.029333* 0.013172 -0.021971** 0.175817*** 
Eit 0.012398 0.041962* 0.023829 0.008964 0.012827 0.628377* -0.023342 0.082418** 0.007880 -0.017124* 0.224087** 
Oit 0.825459*** -0.077102 -1.227905 0.594572*** 1.194636 4.915476 0.531278 1.651760 0.406269 0.473247*** 4.106234 
Wit -10.67342 -10.85707** 5.864837 0.131776 0.749594 -41.77323 31.94280 -5.014964* -222.6310** 0.314294 -61.05920 
Hit 0.007531 0.016184 0.043672 0.001847 0.000558 -0.257724 0.134564** 0.069479* -0.038410 0.017097*** 0.092946 
Cit -0.001312 -0.004785 -0.017423 -0.002471 -0.008506 -0.127133 0.016938 0.022126 -0.002539 -0.001305 -0.043129 
Vt 0.008337*** 0.011994*** 0.007042 0.007115*** 0.006143*** -0.000151 -0.005211 0.021094*** 0.007700* 0.003562** 0.035628*** 
R2 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.88 0.91 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.88 0.97 
8 B - Spreads data in first differences 
cons 2.390599 2.963004 3.864691 -0.919743 2.638869 3.294443 -26.54247*** -0.860533 -5.921267* -0.976995 -5.384966 
St-1 0.277909*** -0.013545 0.280171*** -0.108519 0.051087 0.650882*** 0.314384*** 0.122546 0.063049 -0.131914 0.610137*** 
St-2 -0.350616*** -0.270132*** -0.106984 -0.236920*** 0.025043 -0.256436 -0.201030* -0.356050*** -0.155516 -0.279542*** -0.239020** 
ΔDit 0.011516 -0.000336 -0.080922*** 0.006597 0.001900 -0.072656 -0.064839*** -0.039018 0.033978 0.007259 -0.128477*** 
Git 0.003026 0.017631 0.069605 0.001737 0.013387 -0.105451 0.017452 0.030443* 0.002188 0.001946 0.008320 
Eit -0.024667 -0.021055 -0.048686 3.79E-05 -0.025452 -0.054018 0.260585*** 0.015481 0.069486 0.005067 0.029830 
Oit 0.141871 -0.274232 0.581609 0.788837*** -0.697769 0.489294 0.273901 -0.537820 -0.302401 0.244621** 2.774613 
Wit -5.044381 -10.05571* -0.924797 12.98040* 0.473001 8.725218 17.34853 -3.300572 -210.9775* 1.435451 -42.98122 
Hit 0.014140 0.035246** 0.024979 -0.011996 0.012840 0.177302 0.020254 0.108145*** -0.012168 0.002159 0.084818* 
Cit -0.000963 0.003026 -0.045383* -0.003744 -0.012649 -0.053562 0.079018** -0.014540 -0.003988 -0.002428 -0.063088* 
Vt 0.006392*** 0.011120*** 0.009595 0.005919*** 0.005089*** -0.007909 -0.003537 0.018363*** -0.001898 0.004374*** 0.009430 





Figure 1: 11 EMU 10-year bond yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany´s 
 
 
Note: the in-figure table (top-right corner) displays the peak for each time series and the time at which 
it peaked (e.g.: Portugal´s spread vis-à-vis Germany´s peaked in the 2nd quarter of 2012 at 11,39 p.p.    
 
Figure 2: EMU 10-year bond yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany´s 
           
 
 






















Figure 3: CBOE VIX 
 
Note: CBOE VIX stands for Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatolity Index, “to reflect 
investors' consensus view of future expected stock market volatility”; The first vertical line 
marks 2007:Q2, roughly the first decade of the euro, and the onset of the Global Credit Crunch. 
The second vertical line marks 2009:Q1, which stands for the beginning of the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
 
Figure 4: Differential between GDP growth rate and 10-year bond Yield 
 
 
Note: The differential is computed as the difference between the GDP growth rate minus the 10-year 
bond yield, for the 11 EMU countries, EMU Core countries and EMU Periphery countries, separately. 







Figure 5: Average GDP growth rate and average 10-year bond yield for 11 EMU, Core EMU and Peripheral EMU countries 
 
5a 5b 5c 
   
 
Average 11 EMU 10-year bond yields (full line). Average 
11 EMU GDP growth rate (dashed line). 11 EMU 
countries are AT, BE, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, 
SP. 
 
EMU average Core 10-year bond yields (full line). 
EMU average Core GDP growth rate (dashed line). 
Core countries are AT, BE, FI, FR, LU, NL 
 
EMU average Peripheral 10-year bond yields (full 
line). EMU average Peripheral GDP growth rate 









Table A1: Data shortages time intervals 
      Cross-sections 
 
Time-series 
AT BE GR IE IT FI FR LU NL PT SP 
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Full name Short name 
10 year bond yield 
spread vis-à-vis 
Germany 
Sit Monthly ECB 
Long-term [nominal] interest rate for convergence 
purposes; Debt security issued; 10 years maturity; 
















Pit Quarterly ECB  
Nominal GDP 
growth rate 
Git Quarterly OECD Same quarter previous year; seasonally adjusted 
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Eit Monthly DG 
ECFIN 
Base year: 2005; REER vs. EA 18; HCPI deflator; 
Own calculations: average of monthly rates 
Openness Index Oit Quarterly OECD Own calculations 
Share of outstanding 
debt 
Wit Monthly ECB 
Outstanding amounts of securities other than 
shares, excluding financial derivatives; Central 
government; End of period; Own calculations: 
average of monthly shares 
Inflation Hit Monthly Eurostat 
Annual rate of change; Base year: 2005; All-Items 




Cit Quarterly OECD  
VIX Vt Daily CBOE 






1 if country i  {GR, IE, IT, PT, SP}, 0 otherwise 
Qi 
(core) 
1 if country i  {AT, BE, FI, FR, LU, NL}, 0 otherwise 
Time qualitative 
variables 
Z01t 1 if t  1999:Q1,2007:Q2, 0 otherwise 
Z02t 1 if t  2007:Q3,2009:Q1, 0 otherwise 





Table A3: Fisher-Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) for Individual Unit Root 
 
Variable Probability H0 
Sit 0.12 Not rejected 
ΔDit 0.00 Rejected 
Bit 0.51 Not rejected 
Pit 0.57 Not rejected 
Git 0.00 Rejected 
Eit 0.01 Rejected 
Oit 0.01 Rejected 
Wit 0.63 Rejected 
Hit 0.00 Rejected 
Cit 0.00 Rejected 
Vt 0.00 Rejected 
Model of the Fisher-ADF test is Trend and Intercept; Schwarz Criterion for number of lags; H0: 
Variable is not stationary is rejected at a 10% level. H1: Not H0 
 
Table A4: Kao Residual Cointegration Test 
 













Trend assumption: No deterministic trend; Schwarz Criterion for number of lags; H0: No cointegration 
is rejected at a 5% level. H1: Not H0 
 













AT BE FI FR GR IE IT LU NL PT ES 
Z01 1,67 2,41 0,79 0,65 4,51 5,94 0,13 -1,61 2,17 2,26 1,26 1,98 -1,48 2,59 
Z02 0,14 1,88 -1,96 0,87 1,71 4,76 -1,23 -5,10 -4,19 1,49 3,29 1,90 -1,21 -0,81 






Table A6: Spreads are modelled on the variables below. Baseline regression (1) and 







cons -8.710510 -0.352593 
St-1 1.361706*** 1.339922*** 
St-2 -0.443593*** -0.486935*** 
ΔDit 0.074035*** 0.034906*** 
Git 0.031477 0.013876 
Eit 0.048993 -0.007123 
Oit 2.482409 0.891948 
Wit 3.236360 -0.909502 
Hit 0.086006 0.082944* 
Cit -0.023611 -0.007104 
Vt 0.008311 -0.001129 
St-1*Z01 -10.40794 -2.541023 
St-2*Z01 9.735352 2.608559 
ΔDit*Z01 -0.078082*** -0.035860*** 
Git*Z01 0.118714 0.014754 
Eit*Z01 -0.001144 0.000568 
Oit*Z01 0.258837 0.023953 
Wit*Z01 0.207287 -0.013595 
Hit*Z01 -0.072740 -0.059984 
Cit*Z01 -0.001413 0.031235* 
Vt*Z01 0.011976 -0.000131 
Adj. R2 0.93 0.96 
2SLS country fixed effects; [1999:Q1,2014:Q4]; N=11 (1) and N=10 (2); Robustness model excludes 
Greece; The instruments are the 1 period lag of each regressor; Z01 refers to [1999:Q1,2007:Q2]; The 






































2SLS country fixed effects; [1999:Q1,2014:Q4]; N=10; Robustness model excludes Greece; The 
instruments are the 1 period lag of each regressor; Periphery countries are IE, IT, PT, SP; The asterisks 
*** ** * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
